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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
This paper attempts to develop a simple growth model which relates the volatil-
ity of economic growth and technical progress (or total factor productivity growth,
or simply TFPG). Recently, there has been a growing interest in the relation-
ship between the volatility of the aggregate output and other macroeconomic
variables.1 For instance, Ramey and Ramey (1995) ﬁnd that the (average) eco-
nomic growth rate and the volatility of GDP are negatively correlated. Knack
and Keefer (1995) and Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001, 2002), among
others, ﬁnd that higher institutional quality has a positive eﬀect on economic
growth. Acemoglu et. al. (2003) ﬁnd further that higher institutional quality
helps to reduce growth volatility and mitigate economic crises. De Hak (1999)
and Blackburn and Galindev (2003) provide growth models which relate macro-
economic volatility and the rate of economic growth. They do not, however,
directly relate the technical progress, economic growth and growth volatility.
Aghion and Banerjee (2005) argue that it is the interaction between the en-
trepreneurs and the imperfect capital market which leads to both the business
cycle and economic growth. However, most, if not all, of these papers have not
related volatility to the productivity of the economy. Tang (2002) is perhaps
the ﬁrst cross-country study which establishes that the higher the rate of tech-
nical progress, the lower will be the volatility of economic growth rate. Tang,
however, does not provide a theory for this empirical regularity.
This paper attempts to explain the relationship between technical progress,
macroeconomic volatility and growth by using a simple endogenous growth
model with rent-seeking behavior. The analysis is clearly connected to a grow-
ing literature on how the endogenous career choice between productive entre-
preneurship and rent-seeking behavior can inﬂuence aggregate output. For in-
stance, Baumol (1990) provides many historical examples which show that the
returns to rent-seeking can aﬀect the allocation of entrepreneurship. Murphy,
Shleifer and Vishny (1991) study how the heterogeneity of agents can interact
with the rent-seeking and lead to a lower economic growth rate.2 Acemoglu and
Verdier (1998) present a rich model on the endogenous choice of rent-seeking.
However, perhaps due to the ﬁnite-horizon nature of their model, they do not
explore how rent-seeking activities interact with the determination of economic
growth.3 Tse (2000) carefully calibrates a two-sector general equilibrium model
and ﬁnds that GDP can increase by more than 2 times if monopoly is removed
from the labor market. In a companion paper, Tse (2002) shows that monopoly
in the capital equipment market can also aﬀect employment as well as wages,
and hence has important welfare consequences. Tse (2001) shows that the dis-
tribution of demand can signiﬁcantly change the incentives of ﬁrms to invest
1For instance, see Aghion and Saint-Paul (1998) for a survey.
2In addition, Kwong et. al. (2001) provide evidence that the industrial policies in Singapore
and South Korea have led to discrimination against small and medium size enterprises, a lack
of initiative and government-dependency among the citizens. In the case of South Korea, it
has been argued that it even leads to corruption.
3See Rebelo (1998) for a detailed discussion on the determinants of economic growth.
2and innovate. It follows that ﬁrms indeed have incentives to inﬂuence the dis-
tribution of demand. Finally, Tse (2004) shows how informational friction can
create market power for ﬁrms, thus adversely aﬀecting capital accumulation and
long-run economic growth. This paper takes a preliminary step to show how
rent-seeking activities, which would create some market power for the ﬁrms,
may not only aﬀect the rate of the economic growth, but also its volatility.
Since both the economic growth rate and its volatility are the subjects of
our investigation, they need to be endogenized in the model. Thus, the model
necessarily belongs to the family of stochastic, endogenous growth models.4 The
existing literature, however, is more concerned with the time series implications
of a typical stochastic endogenous growth model and how these time series im-
plications can be veriﬁed, while this paper focuses on how diﬀerent institutions
could aﬀect the (stochastic) time series properties of a growth model, such as
the average growth rate and the volatility of GDP.
Economists have long been aware of the problem of rent-seeking and the
literature which has accumulated is voluminous.5 Recent eﬀorts have explored
several important issues, such as the strategic interactions among potentially
rent-seeking entrepreneurs, the role of constitutions and institutions; and the
importance of the initial distribution of wealth, all of which would aﬀect the
aggregate economic outcomes.6 The present paper builds on the work of An-
geletos and Kollintzas (2000) but modiﬁes their model in two important ways.7
First, this paper abstracts from the capital accumulation, which is important
for the convergence result in Angeletos and Kollintzas (2000).8 Since this paper
focuses on the mean and variance of the economic growth rate, we suppress this
concern. Instead, we endogenizes the economic growth by introducing a simple
R&D technology.9 A merit of this framework is that it can endogenously de-
rive the relationship between rent-seeking and the economic growth rate within
a representative household framework. Certainly, the heterogeneity of agents,
externality eﬀects, income distribution and redistribution issues are important
in understanding the role of rent-seeking in practice. Nevertheless, to com-
plement the existing contribution and to highlight the rent-seeking activities
among ﬁrms, this simple model abstracts from these factors and focuses merely
on the simple, resource allocation consideration which leads to the emergence
of rent-seeking.10
It should be noticed that the signiﬁcance of this research may go beyond
establishing and explaining another stylized fact in growth, namely, a robust
4For instance, see Leung and Quah (1996), Quah (1996, 1997), Lau (1999).
5It is beyond the scope of this paper to survey that literature. Among others, see Buchanan,
Tollison and Tullock (1980), Eicher and Garcia-Penalosa eds (2005), Tullock (1993). Tullock
(2003) provides an account of the term “rent-seeking”.
6Among others, see Drazen (2000) and Persson and Tabellini (2000) for a textbook treat-
ments.
7To be internally consistent, there are some minor amendments as well.
8This follows a referee’s suggestion which we gratefully acknowledge.
9This follows another referee’s suggestion which we also gratefully acknowledge.
10See Angeletos and Kollintzas (2000, footnote 8) for more discussion on the role of hetero-
geneity in understanding the relationship between rent-seeking and growth.
3negative relationship between TFPG and growth volatility.11 Speciﬁcally, if we
regard growth ﬂuctuation as a “bad” thing for the economy, then it may be a
reasonable government objective to eliminate at least part of this “bad” thing,
by improving TFPG of the overall economy.12 Consequently, it may provide
an additional justiﬁcation for various forms of government subsidies to R&D,
since these subsidies promote TPPG and therefore help to “stabilize” growth
ﬂuctuations.13
The organization of this paper is simple. The next section presents some
stylized facts. Then a simple stochastic, dynamic general equilibrium model is
built. The paper will provide conditions under which (endogenous) technical
progress is positively correlated to the rate of economic growth, and at the
same time negatively correlated with the volatility of economic growth rate.
We summarize and conclude in the last section. Detailed proofs are provided in
the appendix.
2S o m e S t y l i z e d F a c t s
There is only limited empirical work on the relationship between growth ﬂuctu-
ations and technical progress, and this section draws heavily on Tang (2002) and
Tang, Groenewold and Leung (2003) (henceforth TGL). Tang (2002) presents
perhaps the ﬁrst systematic analysis of the relationship between growth volatil-
ity and technical progress. Using four diﬀerent measures of TFPG, and data
from 98 diﬀerent countries,14 a robust negative relationship between growth
volatility and TFPG is found. The relationship holds even when the initial per
worker GDP, initial human capital stock and initial productivity gap are con-
trolled for. Depending on the measure of TFPG being used, the point estimates
of TFPG contribution range from −0.33 to −0.75, all statistically signiﬁcant.
Building on the work of Tang (2002), and following the methodology of Ace-
moglu et. al. (2003), TGL evaluate the role of technical change in aﬀecting
the macroeconomic volatility, crises and growth. Using diﬀerent samples and
control variables, they ﬁnd that better institutional quality accelerates tech-
nical change, which in turn reduces growth volatility and mitigates economic
crises. Their results are robust to a large number of alternative speciﬁcations
and controls for simultaneity. Figures 1, 2 and table 1 provide a summary of
their empirical results.15
11Throughout this paper, the term "productivity" and "technological progress" will be used
interchangeably.
12There is a debate on whether the post-war aggregate ﬂuctuations of the U.S.A. has been
stablized, and whether the government policies have been eﬀective in this respect. It is beyond
the scope of this paper to survey that literature and interested readers may consult Stock and
Watson (1999).
13There has been some discussion in the literature of the diﬀerence between the private and
social return of R&D. Among others, see Jones and Williams (1998, 2000).
14Due to the data availability, one of the measure of the TFPG can only be calculated for
56 countries.
15See TGL for details.
4(Figure 1, 2 and Table 1 about here)
3 A Baseline Model
This section presents a simple growth model. Time is discrete and the horizon
is inﬁnite. The economy is populated by a large number N of identical inﬁnite-
lived agents. Each agent operates their own production technology. In each







where 0 <β<1, ct(z) is the consumption of the agent z at period t.F o r
simplicity, the utility function takes the log form: u(cs(z)) = ln(cs(z)).16 The
representative agent maximizes (1) subject to the budget constraint and the
time constraint





t(z) ≤ 1, (3)
where St(z) is the subsidy factor for agent z,a n dyt(z) is the output of agent
z. Clearly, if St(z) is larger (smaller) than unity, then agent z is receiving




t(z) are the fraction of time
employed in productive, rent-seeking activities, and R&D respectively, which are




t(z) > 0. To highlight the importance
of rent-seeking activities, we follow Angeletos and Kollintzas (2000) in assuming
that the net amount of subsidy depends on the rent seeking eﬀort of agent z














t is taken as given in agent z’s maximization problem, and will be determined
at the equilibrium. θ2 is a parameter to measure the importance of rent-seeking
eﬀorts in determining the government subsidy (or tax). Clearly, if θ2 =0 , then
individual rent-seeking eﬀorts are not eﬀective at all. We will discuss the gov-
ernment budget constraint later. We assume that 0 <θ 2 < 1.
The production side is very simple here. The output of agent z only depends
on the productive eﬀort of agent z, l
y






16In the current setting, relaxing this assumption will only complicate the algebra without
any additional insights.
5with 0 <θ 1 < 1. We further impose the restriction that θ1 + θ2 < 1.
To solve the individual maximization problem, we proceed in two steps.
First, we take the R&D eﬀort ld
t(z) as given, and only determine the allocation
between production and rent-seeking activity. We take this optimal allocation
into the second step, which is to pin down the R&D eﬀort. The ﬁrst step is







































2 (θ1 + θ2)
−(θ1+θ2) > 0.
Now we move to the second step, which is to determine the optimal time
allocated to R&D activities. Since R&D aﬀects future rather than current pro-
ductivity, the maximization problem is necessarily dynamic in nature. Further-
more, to determine the optimal R&D eﬀort, it is necessary to know the marginal
return of investing in R&D. For simplicity, we assume that the research eﬀort
for each individual is observable to all other agents, and that aggregate produc-
tivity growth depends on the R&D eﬀorts of all agents. Formally, the aggregate










with probability 1 − p
, (9)
where γt i st h eg r o w t hr a t eo fp r o d u c t i v i t yb e t w e e np e r i o dt and t +1 , γt ≡
At+1/At, and Γg is a parameter describing the growth rate in a "good state",
Γg > 1/β > 1, p is an exogenously given probability, 0 <p<1, and
− →
ld
t is the vec-











tice that while the probabilities of diﬀerent "states of Nature" are exogenous, the
levels of the realization are endogenous.17 To capture the idea that the level of







0, ∀z, and the natural restriction that the growth rate of a good state is higher









17For a comparison of the moral hazard type model, see Kahn (1990), Leung (2001).
6Since 1 >l d
t (z) > 0, ∀z, the desired conditions are all satisﬁed. In addition, this
formulation will prove to be very tractable. Given all these assumptions, it is
easy to see that the individual’s dynamic optimization problem (i.e. maximizing


























































t (z − 1), ld
t (z +1 )... ld
t (N)
¢
.N o t i c e t h a t
with probability p,p e r i o dt +1productivity will increase to At+1 = ΓgAt, as
described by (9). Clearly, (11) is very diﬃcult to solve in general. In this paper,
for expositional purposes, we will restrict our attention to the time-invariant
labor allocation equilibrium.
Deﬁnition 1 In a time-invariant labor allocation equilibrium,
ld
t (z)=ld (z), ∀z, Lx
t = Lx, ∀t. (12)
Notice that there is no capital in this model and the productivity shock is
i.i.d., and hence the time-invariant condition may not be as restrictive as it
seems.18 Consequently, by (8), lx
t (z)=lx (z), l
y
t (z)=ly (z), ∀z, ∀t.T h i st i m e -
invariant condition (12) leads to several results. First, we can characterize the
value function.



















+ a3 lnld(z)+a4 lnLx,
(13)
where a1,...,a3 > 0, a4 < 0, are functions of parameter and other agents’
R&D eﬀorts.
The proposition is basically proved by substituting the conjecture into equa-
tion (11), and is detailed in the appendix. Given this explicit functional form,
it is then straightforward to compute the individual optimal R&D eﬀort (again,
all proofs can be found in the appendix):
18We, however, cannot prove that it is the only equilibrium in this model.
7Lemma 3 The optimal individual level R&D eﬀort is given by the following
expression,
ld (z)=
β (a3 + a1 (1 − p)(1/N))
θ1 + θ2 + βa2 + β (a3 + a1 (1 − p)(1/N))
. (14)
Clearly, 0 <l d (z) < 1. Also notice that the value of ld (z) does not depend
on a0(z), and is hence identical across diﬀerent agents,
Corollary 4 ld (z)=ld.
Thus, we do not need to impose, but rather derive symmetry under the
time-invariant labor allocation equilibrium. Now, substituting this fact into
(10) delivers the following result,
Corollary 5 Γb = Γgld < Γg as ld < 1.
Now, by (8) and (12), (6) is simpliﬁed as
yt(z)=At (ly(z))
θ1 , ∀z,∀t, (15)
with the value of ly(z) b e i n gp i n n e dd o w nb y( 8 ) . A n ds i n c ew eh a v ea l r e a d y
solved for the optimal ld in (14), we know the distribution of the productivity
growth, γt ≡ At+1/At, by (9). Thus, to close the model, we only need to dictate
the value of the average rent-seeking activities Lx and the government subsidy
St(z). However, since ld (z)=ld, by (8), lx (z)=lx. The rent-seeking activities
are also equalized across agents at the equilibrium. Thus, by (4) and (5), we
have the following result,
Corollary 6 Lx = lx(z), ∀z,a n dSt(z)=1 , ∀z, ∀t.
In other words, there is no net subsidy across agents. Thus, everyone con-
sumes his/her own production, ct(z)=St(z)yt(z)=yt(z), ∀z, ∀t. A n di nt h a t
case, the government budget will be trivially balanced,
N X
z=1
[(1 − St(z))yt(z)] = 0,
as the term (1 − St(z)) = 0, ∀z, ∀t. Notice however that, even though there
is no net transfer of consumption goods across agents, there is a non-trivial
amount of labor eﬀorts spent in rent-seeking activities, lx (z)=lx > 0.T h u s ,
it is analogous to the Prisoner’s Dilemma, where every agent is worse oﬀ under
"the rent-seeking game", although no individual has the incentive to exit from
it, given the participation of other agents.
8Now, we are ready to study the stationary equilibrium growth path.19 By
restricting our attention to the time-invariant labor allocation equilibrium, we
have already shown that labor allocation is identical across agents, and that
there is no net transfer of consumption goods across agents. In particular, as
ld (z)=ld,l y (z)=ly by (8). Thus, by (15), we deduce that output is identical
across agents,
Corollary 7 yt(z)=yt, ∀z, ∀t.
The aggregate output of this economy is Yt ≡
PN
z=1 yt(z)=Nyt, where
yt = At (ly)
θ1 . And we denote the economic growth rate by γY
t , γY
t ≡ Yt+1/Yt.
With these deﬁnitions, it is then easy to prove the following results:
Proposition 8 In this economy, (i) the economic growth rate is equal to the
productivity growth rate,
γY
t = γt, ∀t, (16)
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, (17)












Equipped with these results, it is easy to see that both mean economic
growth and mean technical progress are increasing in R&D eﬀorts, and that the
variance of the economic growth rate is decreasing in R&D eﬀorts. Thus, this
model reproduces the stylized facts discussed in the stylized facts section:
Proposition 9 The mean productivity growth and mean economic growth rate
are negatively correlated with the variance of the economic growth rate.
This result begs the question of why R&D eﬀort diﬀe r sa c r o s sc o u n t r i e s .T h e
appendix shows that (14) can be simpliﬁed as
ld =
β (1 − β)
−1 (1 − p)(1/N)
(θ1 + θ2)+β (1 − β)
−1 (1 − p)(1/N)
, (19)
which implies the following result:














19See Quah (1996, 1997) for a formal deﬁnition.
9The intuition is very clear. If the marginal return to either goods production
(governed by θ1) or rent-seeking activities (governed by θ2)f a l l s ,t h e ni ti s
natural to re-allocate the labor input to those activities and hence decrease the
R&D eﬀort. If the probability of realizing a good state of nature (p)i n c r e a s e s ,
then the importance of R&D eﬀorts decreases, and so, therefore, will R&D
eﬀort. If the number of research agents (N) increases, then it is rational for
the individual to "free-ride" on the others and hence the R&D eﬀort will also
decrease.
Notice that the parameter θ2 which is a proxy for the importance of rent-
seeking activities in shaping the net transfer of output from the government, can
be interpreted as an "institution parameter". And if the institution improves,
which means a decline in θ2, the R&D eﬀort ld will increase (by (20)). And
by (16), (17) and (18), we know that the expected rate of technical progress
and expected rate of economic growth will increase, and the variance of the
economic growth rate will decrease. And this mechanism exactly match the
empirical evidence provided by Tang (2002) and Tang, Groenewold and Leung
(2003).
4C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
Research is typically subsidized. Among others, the subsidy can be in the form
of a tax credit, or a subsidy to higher education.20 And a common justiﬁca-
tion for such subsidies is that the social return to research exceeds its private
counterpart and it is the government’s duty to correct this market failure by
providing subsidization.21 This paper provides a supplementary justiﬁcation: a
higher level of technical progress indeed decreases growth volatility, and a re-
duction of growth volatility is typically interpreted as a “good” thing for society.
In other words, this paper claims that technical progress contributes to “out-
put stabilization.” This task is achieved by pointing to the stylized facts, that
better institutional quality accelerates technical progress, which reduces growth
volatility and increases the (average) economic growth rate. With rent-seeking
behavior, production activities and R&D eﬀorts all being endogenized, this pa-
per builds a stochastic, endogenous growth model which successfully mimic these
stylized facts.
Future research can extend the analysis in several directions. For instance,
many simpliﬁcations have been made to keep the model tractable, such as ab-
stracting from the accumulation of physical capital and the heterogeneity of
agents. Relaxing these assumptions can lead to a much more realistic model
and much richer aggregate dynamics through the evolution of the income dis-
tribution. Also, the representative agent assumption suppresses the possibility
of a liquidity constraint. If the accumulation of physical capital is allowed, and
20For instance, see Hanushek and Welch (2005).
21See, among others, Jones and Williams (1998, 2000) for a review of the literature and
evidence.
10yet the ﬁxed cost of starting a business or research is much high than that of
rent-seeking activities, liquidity constrained agents may be forced to allocate
their talents to the latter, thereby aﬀecting the income distribution and the
aggregate dynamics. The transitional dynamics in that situation can be very
rich. In addition, the paper stresses the role of technical progress in promot-
ing economic growth, and suppress the importance of human capital.22 The
two factors, however, can be complementary rather than substitute for each
other, as demonstrated by Acemoglu (1996, 1997, 1998).23 Notice that the ac-
cumulation of human capital will demand a time input, which is also essential
to rent-seeking activities. Thus, introducing human capital accumulation into
the current framework will lead to much richer dynamics, which is part of our
ongoing research agenda.
In the model, it is assumed that each agent produces, carries out R&D, and
also lobbies the government. One can consider a framework in which these activ-
ities become choice variables and hence introduce a much richer structure of the
economy. One can also follow Eicher and Garcia-Penalosa (2005) to distinguish
between “predatory lawyers” and “institution-building lawyers” and to endoge-
nously determine the degree of property right protection and hence the rate of
technical progress. Alternatively, one can follow Tse (2004) in explicitly mod-
elling the informational frictions and to provide a much deep micro-structure of
the market power and rent-seeking activities. All these possibilities are remained
to be explored.
22However, there is a large debate on the relative roles of technology and human capital
accumulation in driving economic growth which is too large to be reviewed here. See, among
others, the exchange between Bils and Klenow (2000) and Hanushek and Kimko (2000), Barro
(2001) and Prescott (2002).
23See also Leung (1995).
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(If this appendix is not published, it will be available upon request)
AP r o o f s
A.1 Proof of (13)
The proposition is basically proved by substituting the conjecture into equation
(11), and the left hand side is basically the conjectured functional form, a0(z)+






























+a3 lnld(z)+ a4 lnLx), which can be re-written as









+a3 lnld(z)+ a4 lnLx)+ βa1 lnAt +βa1 lnΓg +β (1 − p)a1 (1/N)
PN
z=1 lnld (z).
Thus, by simply comparing coeﬃcients on diﬀerent terms, we have
a0(z)=( 1− β)






a1 =( 1 − β)
−1 ,
a2 =( 1 − β)
−1 (θ1 + θ2),
a3 =( 1 − β)
−2 β (1 − p)(1/N),
a4 =( 1 − β)
−1 (−θ2), (21)
and clearly, a1,...,a 3 > 0, a4 < 0. This conﬁrms the initial conjecture.
A.2 Proof of (14)
The proof is straightforward. We substitute the functional form for V into













Simply re-arranging terms will yield (14).
A.3 Proof of (16), (17), (18)
By deﬁnition, Yt ≡
PN
z=1 yt(z)=Nyt, where yt = At (ly)
θ1, ly (z)=ly,
∀z. Again, by deﬁnition, γY









=( At+1)/(At)= γt, which is (16).
16Notice that the economic growth rate is an i.i.d. process and hence the






= E (γt)=pΓg +( 1− p)Γb
= pΓg +( 1− p)Γgld,a sΓb = Γgld
= Γg
£
p +( 1− p)ld¤
,
which is (17).









































A.4 Proof of (19)
The proof is simple. We substitute (21) into (14) to get (19).
A.5 Proof of (20)
Simply diﬀerentiate the expression for ld in (19) with respect to diﬀerent para-
meters to deliver (20).
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hTable 1: Determinants of Macroeconomic Volatility (Robustness to Regional Dummy, Geography, Weather, Human Capital, 























































































Africa   0.65 
(0.61) 
    0.25 
(0.17)  
   
Asia   (0.49) 
(0.49) 
    0.31 
(0.19) 
   
Latin America    0.06 
(0.07) 
    - 0 . 2 9  
(-0.21) 
   
Latitude     -0.90 
(-0.61) 
   -0.58 
(-0.32) 
   




   
Mean 
Temperature 




   
Human  Capital           -0.15 
(-0.30) 
  





         0 . 9 8  
(0.66) 
Observations  60 60 59 58 60 57 50 60 48 
R-Square  0.34 0.37 0.34 0.35 0.35 0.38 0.40 0.29 0.24 Notes: 
1.  Parentheses contain t-ratios. ** and * indicate statistical significance at one or five percent level, respectively, for a one-tailed test. 
2.  Macroeconomic volatility is measured by the standard deviation of annual real GDP per capita growth rate for the period 1970-98. 
3.  Initial constraint on executive measures the institutional and other constraints that are placed on presidents and dictators. It has a scale from 1 to 7, with 
higher scores indicating more constraints. Score of 1 indicates unlimited authority; score of 3 indicates slight to moderate limitations; score of 5 indicates 
substantial limitations; score of 7 indicates executive parity or subordination. Scores of 2, 4 and 6 indicate intermediate values. We average the scores for 
1950, 1960 and 1970 to obtain the average initial constraint. Data are available from Polity III dataset compiled by Keith Jaggers and Ted Robert Gurr, 1996, 
Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social research. This variable is instrumented by the mortality rate of European settler in the ex-colonies. Data 
are obtained from Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001).  
4.  TFPG is total factor productivity growth over the period 1970-90, which is taken from Tang (2002). This TFPG is estimated using a cross-country regression 
with the growth of output per worker as the dependent variable and a constant and the growth of physical capital stock per worker as the independent 
variables. TFPG is instrumented by legal system (English, French, German and Scandinavian) and the logarithm of real GDP per capita in 1970. Data for 
legal system are taken from La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (1998) and the website of CIA- The World Fact Book 2002. 
5.  Africa: Dummy variable taking value 1 if a country belongs to Africa, 0 otherwise. 
6.  Asia: Dummy variable taking value 1 if a country belongs to Asia, 0 otherwise. 
7.  Latin America: Dummy variable taking value 1 if a country belongs to Latin America or the Caribbean, 0 otherwise. 
8.  Latitude: Absolute value of the latitude of the country, which is a measure of distance from the equator, scaled to take values between 0 and 1, where 0 is the 
equator. See La Porta et al. (1999). 
9.  Coastal area: Proportion of land area within 100 km of the seacoast. From McArthur and Sachs (2001). 
10.  Mean temperature: 1987 mean annual temperature in degrees Celsius from McArthur and Sachs (2001). 
11.  Human capital: Natural logarithm of one plus the average years of schooling for the period 1970-90. Data are available from Barro and Lee (1993).  
12.  Openness: The average ratio of nominal imports plus exports to GDP in Purchasing-Power-Parity US dollars (PPP GDP) for the period 1970-90. Data are 
available from Penn World Table Mark 5.6. 
13.  Financial development: Natural logarithm of value of credits by financial intermediaries (banks and non-banks) to the private sector divided by GDP. 
Figures are averages for the period 1970-90 taken from International Financial Statistics (IFS) lines 32d/line 99b. 